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Fiscal federalism and decentralization have been studied and researched by acade-
mics and scientists all over the world since the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Accordingly, the literature on various perspectives of fiscal federalism has grown 
rapidly over the years. Although the well-known Oates classification (traditional 
vs. modern theory) of fiscal federalism literature according to its vertical structure, 
or in terms of evolution, provides a good insight into the genesis of fiscal federa-
lism thinking, it does not help much in differentiating among the various aspects 
of fiscal federalism abundantly researched in recent literature. The modern theory 
of fiscal federalism turned out to be so extensive that Oates’ vertical systematiza-
tion proved to be insufficient. Despite the fact that most recent reviews rely on 
Oates’s division of the literature, the need for a complementary systematization 
emerged rapidly.
Classification and systematization of such a huge literature body in order to faci-
litate access to relevant information for people studying or working in the field of 
fiscal federalism has become a real challenge. To resolve this, experts from va-
rious subfields edited works with selected contributing authors clarifying certain 
topics and providing solid fundaments for further research. Ahmad and Brosio’s 
“Effective federalism and local finance” is certainly one of the greatest examples. 
In contrast to Oates’s vertical structure of fiscal federalism literature, Ahmad and 
Brosio present a more horizontal structure based on major logically organized 
research areas.
The title was published in 2011 by Edward Elgar Publishing in the International 
Library of Critical Writings in Economics Series – a thematic selection of the 
most important articles in economics. Each title within this series is edited by le-
ading specialists who provide an introduction and comment on the publications 
included. Given the topic of this issue, their professional competences and years 
of experience in researching fiscal federalism have certainly helped Ahmad and 
Brosio to successfully fulfill their editing role. 
Ehtisham Ahmad is a Senior Fellow at University of Bonn, and a Visiting Senior 
Fellow at the London School of Economics Asia Research Centre in the United 
Kingdom. He has held senior positions in the International Monetary Fund, colla-
borated on projects for the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, UN and was a 
special adviser to the Finance Minister of Saudi Arabia. Ahmad has researched 
and written extensively in the fields of fiscal federalism and the political economy 
of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Giorgio Brosio is a professor of public fina-
nce and local government at the University of Turin. He has held professorial 
positions at several universities in Italy, Switzerland and France. Brosio was also 
a visiting fellow at the University of York, at the Brookings Institution, Brown 
University, the Australian National University and the International Monetary 
Fund. His main research interests include fiscal federalism, local government, pu-
blic economics and finance, and public choice. Both Ahmad and Brosio are proli-
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 federalism literature. The fact that they edited this issue at the zenith of their care-
ers makes the editors’ pick of articles included in “Effective federalism and local 
finance” more credible and reliable. 
The title is divided into two volumes. Volume I, How federal and decentralized 
systems work and institutional underpinnings, has 562 and Volume II, Federal 
and decentralized policy, governance, issues and challenges, 709 pages (1271 
pages in total). The two together encompass 50 seminal articles on fiscal fede-
ralism dating from 1961 to 2009. Articles are systematically grouped into 9 the-
matically separated parts – the first three of them (Theoretical advances, Mobility 
and strategic behavior and Institutions) being incorporated in Volume I and the 
rest (Decentralized policies and governance, Financing and accountability, Taxa-
tion of natural resources, Governance considerations, Macro-fiscal management 
and political economy of subnational debt and Environment and natural disasters) 
in Volume II. 
In other words, the first volume deals mostly with foundations of fiscal federalism 
and other, more general, issues. It begins with the theoretical framework for fiscal 
federalism laid down in Oates (2008), Olson (1969) and Oates (1981) discussing 
fiscal federalism theory and institutions, as well as the division of responsibilities 
among different levels of government. The absence of Tiebout (1956) in this part 
was partially compensated for by Oates (1981) which refers to the work of Tie-
bout, but Tiebout’s seminal paper presented in its original form would definitely 
have fitted into this part and made it more complete. Seabright (1996), Lockwood 
(2009) and Salmon (1987) conclude the first part discussing accountability issues 
and political economy aspects of fiscal decentralization as well as competition and 
spatial interactions between governments. The rest of Volume I (parts II and III) 
deals with local governments’ strategic behavior, population movements within 
countries, redistributive policies and institutions. The list of main contributors to 
these parts includes Keen (1998), Wildasin (2003), Dixit and Londregan (1998), 
Salmon (2002) and Gurgur and Shah (2002).
Policy-related questions and experiences are extensively represented in the se-
cond volume. Accordingly, the first two parts of Volume II consist of papers cove-
ring various aspects of the decentralized provision of public services and local 
government financing. Although these fields have always been present in the fiscal 
federalism literature, hyperproduction in these areas resulted in a vast literature of 
questionable quality. Therefore, the editors’ selection of the most relevant papers 
(e.g. Ahmad, Brosio and Tanzi, 2008; Ambrosanio and Bordignon, 2006; Oates, 
1999 and Musgrave, 1961) serves as a unique source of highly relevant literature, 
which is certainly of great assistance in dealing with the overload in recent fiscal 
federalism literature. The last four parts of this volume are particularly valuable. 
As opposed to the first two parts, the rest of the volume flourishes with themes not 
so much represented in the literature. Those include taxation of natural resources 
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2006), macro-fiscal management and political economy of subnational debt (Qian 
and Roland, 1998; Rodden and Wibbels, 2002), as well as environmental issues 
and natural disasters (Oates, 2002; Goodspeed and Haughwout, 2007). 
Published as a book chapter, Brosio (2003) examines arguments for sharing the 
natural resources revenue among different levels of government. Ahmad, Albino-
War and Singh (2006) focus on fiscal management at the local government level 
and conclude that “even with adequate monitoring of subnational spending, there 
has to be an emphasis on the effects of such spending, particularly the incurring of 
debt and other contingent liabilities, on overall macroeconomic aggregates”. Qian 
and Roland (1998) provide interesting insights into the soft budget constraint pro-
blem, while Rodden and Wibbels (2002) test various hypotheses concerning the 
influence of different factors on a federation’s capacity to control deficits and in-
flation, claiming that “increased decentralization of expenditures in federations is 
associated with lower deficits and inflation”. Oates (2002) deals with (de)centrali-
zation of environmental responsibilities, making a solid base for Goodspeed and 
Haughwout (2007) to conclude Volume II devoting particular attention to natural 
disasters and optimal insurance system.
Overall, the selection of the most important topics, well organized in clearly sepa-
rated thematic sections, yet vividly connected and intertwined in the Introduction, 
makes the “Effective Federalism and Local Finance” a highly valuable piece in 
fiscal federalism literature. By creating the list of publications to be included in 
this title, Ahmad and Brosio did not favor the classical masterpieces but rather 
prioritised more recent articles systematically discussing current issues and con-
cerns in fiscal federalism. Missing Tiebout (1956) in the first part of Volume I or 
Kornai’s articles on the soft budget constraint in the fifth part of Volume II addi-
tionally supports this argument. Although the shortlisted articles discuss both tra-
ditional and contemporary aspects of intergovernmental fiscal relations from the 
current perspective, they mostly rely on the classical literature of fiscal federalism. 
This makes Ahmad and Brosio’s book a remarkable reference source for students, 
researchers and lecturers. Fiscal federalism literature was in want of a book that 
systematically integrates the most important advances in this area and “Effective 
Federalism and Local Finance” has certainly met the need.
This opulent repository of fiscal federalism literature gathers in one place the most 
important publications evolving continuously in this field for almost half a ce-
ntury. All the publications are presented in their original form with their original 
numeration to facilitate referencing. However, the title is complemented with its 
own numeration which considerably simplifies moving through different publica-
tions. Reprinting all the articles in their original form significantly enriched the 
edition interfacing present and past analytical tools and writing styles. The pick of 
articles and diversification of topics make the title required reading for both begin-
ners and professionals dealing with fiscal federalism issues. Students could use 
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federalism, while more advanced users could benefit from refreshing their 
knowledge with both traditional and modern concepts emerging through the deve-
lopment of fiscal federalism theory. “Effective Federalism and Local Finance” is 
definitely an essential guide for anyone studying, researching or in any other way 
dealing with intergovernmental fiscal relations. It might also prove useful for 
practitioners and policymakers, enabling them to understand the consequences of 
fiscal interaction among different layers of government. 
This is certainly not a book to read and set aside; rather, it is a fundamental piece 
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